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We address the equilibrium concept of a reverse auction game so that no one can enhance
the individual payoff by a unilateral change when all the others follow a certain strategy.
In this approach the combinatorial possibilities to consider become very much involved
even for a small number of players, which has hindered a precise analysis in previous
works. We here present a systematic way to reach the solution for a general number of
players, and show that this game is an example of conflict between the group and the
individual interests.
Keywords: Lowest unique positive integer game; Nash equilibrium; projection operator;
social dilemma
1. Introduction
Game theory deals with a situation where each player’s payoff is dependent not
only on her own behavior but also on other players’. Players will generally have
conflicting interests with each other, but they may get better off by interacting with
others in various ways [1]. For example, in the minority game [2], a player gets a
point when her choice is minor among players. Thus, even if a choice happened
to be successful at previous rounds, it is hard to remain minor with that choice as
more and more players will also select it. Although it is not possible for all the
players to win together, the average probability of winning can become enhanced if
they behave in proper ways.
Recently, an extreme version of the minority game was proposed as a special
case of the reverse auction, which is called the lowest unique positive integer (LUPI)
game [3]. This game has n > 2 players, and each of them may choose one integer
from 1 to n. A player wins a point by choosing the lowest unique number. That
means, simply choosing the number 1 is not a good strategy since it is very likely
to be chosen by other players, too. In Ref. [4], this LUPI game was analyzed in
terms of the Nash equilibrium (NE): Let us imagine that every player participates
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in a game with her own strategy, which is publicly known to the other players. If
no player can improve her payoff by changing her strategy alone, the set of the
players’ strategies is called a NE. Even though this is an adequate framework to
analyze a game, the actual enumeration of combinatorial possibilities becomes hard
to manage as the number of players increases. Although Ref. [4] tried to find an
expression for general n, many of the possible cases were missing in the probability
calculations, even for n = 4. According to the suggested formula in Ref. [4], all the
loosing bids should be above the winning number or all should be below the winning
number. Furthermore, if they are below the winning number, they should all be
on the same number. However, there exist many more cases that would generate
the same winning number. We henceforth present a way to take all the possibilities
into account correctly for general n and analyze the results thereby obtained.
2. Equilibrium
Suppose that each player draws numbers from her own probability distribution,
which we will denote as her strategy. As explained above, we will find a NE in
this strategy space. Among several different NE’s in the LUPI game, we will be
concerned with one that can be prevalent among these n players, as studied in
Ref. [4]. This approach actually corresponds to the stability concept in the evo-
lutionary game theory [5]. Let us imagine that n − 1 people are using a certain
strategy, ~p = (p1, p2, . . . pn), where pi means the probability to choose number i.
The idea is to choose ~p so that the chance of winning for the nth player becomes
independent of her strategy. We consider all the possible cases that those n − 1
people can make. These can be symbolically represented by
Z0 =
(
n∑
i=1
pi
)n−1
, (1)
from which all the combinations can be obtained as separate terms. For example, in
a three-players game we get Z0 = (p1+p2+p3)
2 = p21+p
2
2+p
3
3+2p1p2+2p1p3+2p2p3,
where the first three terms on the right-hand side mean that players 1 and 2 chose
the same number 1, 2 or 3, respectively. The other three terms correspond to the
cases when players 1 or 2 have chosen two different numbers. Together, these terms
represent all the possible outcomes of the game (as seen from the third player) since
they add up to the probability 1 due to the normalization condition
∑n
i pi = 1.
Now, starting from Eq. (1), we extract all the cases where there is a winner,
among the n − 1 players, at number 1. These are characterized by all the terms
which contain only one p1. In other words, if we write Eq. (1) as a polynomial in
p1:
Z0 = A(p2, . . . , pn) +B(p2, . . . , pn)p1 + C(p2, . . . , pn)p
2
1 + . . . ,
those cases are expressed by the second term and one can easily find it by B =
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dZ0/dp1|p1=0. In other words, we find the cases with no winner at number 1 as
Z1 = Z0 − dZ0
dp1
∣∣∣∣
p1=0
p1
=
(
n∑
i=1
pi
)n−1
− (n− 1)p1

 n∑
i6=1
pi


n−2
.
If we are further to exclude the cases where there is a winner at number 2, we apply
the same operation on Z1 as follows:
Z2 = Z1 − dZ1
dp2
∣∣∣∣
p2=0
p2
=
(
n∑
i=1
pi
)n−1
− (n− 1)p1

 n∑
i6=1
pi


n−2
− (n− 1)p2

 n∑
i6=2
pi


n−2
+ (n− 1)(n− 2)p1p2

 n∑
i6=1,2
pi


n−3
.
Generalizing this idea, we can find cases where there is no winner up to an arbitrary
number i by the following recursion relation:
Zi = Zi−1 − dZi−1
dpi
∣∣∣∣
pi=0
pi. (2)
Formally, we may define Li as the linearity projection operator with respect to pi.
Let us denote a generic polynomial of p1, . . . , pn as Q, which may have an index
to indicate more than one polynomial. The operator Li can be algebraically repre-
sented as Li[Q] = piEi ·Di[Q], where Ei is elimination of pi by substituting zero and
Di is differentiation with respect to pi. In addition, a and b mean some coefficients
independent of pi. We then have the following relations for these operators:
• Li[apni ] = apiδ1,n
• Li · Li[Q] = Li[Q]
• Li · Lj[Q] = Lj · Li[Q]
• Li[aQ1 + bQ2] = aLi[Q1] + bLi[Q2]
• Ej · Li[Q] = Li · Ej [Q]
• Li[Zj ] = 0, if i ≤ j
where δ1,n is the Kronecker delta. It immediately follows that
Zk =
{
k∏
i=1
(1− Li)
}
[Z0]. (3)
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Let us now calculate the probability for the nth player to win the LUPI game by
choosing number i. Then within the other n− 1 people, there should be no winner
up to i−1 and no one should choose the number i. The last condition can be easily
imposed by the same trick. That is, we simply substitute zero for pi to exclude every
case where pi appears. Therefore, the probability of our concern is simply written
as ci(~p) = Ei[Zi−1] =
{∏i−1
j=1 (1− Lj)
}
·Ei[Z0] and the nth player’s expected payoff
is
W (~π; ~p) =
n∑
i=1
ci(~p)πi,
where ~π = (π1, π2, ..., πn) is the nth player’s strategy.
For example,
c1 = Z0|p1=0 =

 n∑
i6=1
pi


n−1
= (1 − p1)n−1, (4)
c2 = Z1|p2=0 =

 n∑
i6=2
pi


n−1
− (n− 1)p1

 n∑
i6=1,2
pi


n−2
= (1− p2)n−1 − (n− 1)p1(1 − p1 − p2)n−2, (5)
c3 = Z2|p3=0
=

 n∑
i6=3
pi


n−1
− (n− 1)p1

 n∑
i6=1,3
pi


n−2
− (n− 1)p1

 n∑
i6=2,3
pi


n−2
+ (n− 1)(n− 2)p1p2

 n∑
i6=1,2,3
pi


n−3
= (1− p3)n−1 − (n− 1)p1(1 − p1 − p3)n−2
− (n− 1)p2(1− p2 − p3)n−2
+ (n− 1)(n− 2)p1p2(1 − p1 − p2 − p3)n−3. (6)
From the normalization condition, pn = 1 −
∑n−1
i=1 pi, indeed we have only n − 1
degrees of freedom in choosing ~p so that
W (~π; ~p) =
n−1∑
i=1
(ci − cn)πi + cn.
The NE solution, ~pNE, should satisfy ci(~pNE) = constant for every i so that W
cannot be better by changing ~π. That is, the chance of winning is the same on
all numbers. For n = 3, all the above calculation coincides with that presented in
Ref. [4]. Note that we have n− 1 degrees of freedom and n− 1 equations so we can
solve these simultaneously. Figure 1(a) shows solutions for some n values, obtained
by using the Newton method. In Fig. 1(b), we plot its scaled version, considering
that the horizontal axis naturally scales with n, and the vertical axis roughly with
1/n.
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Fig 1. (a) NE strategies, ~pNE, with varying the number of players, n. (b) Scaled plots with respect
to n. As n increase, the solution deviates more from the uniform solution (dotted).
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Fig 2. (a) The expected chance of winning by choosing i, when the other n− 1 players follow the
uniform solution defined as pi = 1/n. (b) Comparison of outcomes scaled with n. The uniform
solution gives an outcome that rapidly converges to the theoretical maximum W = 1/n (dotted),
while the NE outcome remains below that. The other two curves represent outcomes from the
strategies suggested in previous works.
Setting c1 = c2 from Eqs. (4) and (5), we find
(1− p2)n−1 − (1 − p1)n−1 = (n− 1)p1(1− p1 − p2)n−2. (7)
Since the right-hand side should be positive, we can conclude that p2 < p1 for every
finite n, which means the equilibrium solution cannot be uniform. Its implication
is remarkable: Let us imagine that everyone employs the same strategy ~p. In other
words, ~π = ~p. The question is what the strategy ~p should be in order to maximize
the expected payoff, W (~p; ~p). For example, for n = 3, we find
W (~p; ~p) = (1− p1)(1 − p2)(1− p3),
which is maximized at a uniform solution, ~p∗ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). This is clearly
different from the NE solution, ~pNE = (2
√
3− 3, 2−√3, 2−√3) [4]. The expression
is not so simple for n > 3, but solving ∇~pW (~p; ~p) = 0 under
∑
i pi = 1, we still
see that the uniform solution gives the best outcome to the population on average.
Although we confirmed this only for n ≤ 12, this result is plausible since the risk of
overlapping choices will be minimized by the uniform solution. On the other hand,
we already know that the equilibrium strategy cannot be uniform. Indeed, if all
the people follow ~p∗ = (1/n, . . . , 1/n), a player’s chance of winning rapidly decays
with her chosen number i [Fig. 2(a)]. For example, one may use the formulation
above to obtain ci = e
−1(1−e−1)i−1 for large n, which coincide with the multinomial
analysis in Ref. [3]. Therefore, each player is motivated to deviate from this uniform
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solution by choosing low numbers more frequently. In short, there exists a dilemma
between the best and the equilibrium strategy. Note that since each play only has
one winner, the theoretical upper limit for the gain per play is 1/n. Let us then
compare these three cases: the equilibrium outcome, the best possible outcome, and
the theoretical upper limit [Fig 2(b)]. While the uniform solution quickly converges
to the theoretical maximum, the NE solution remains suboptimal in this plot. For
comparison, we also plot outcomes from the strategies in previous works: Ref. [3]
suggested a strategy with p1 = p2 = 1/2 which gives W (~p, ~p) = 2
1−n, while in
Ref. [4] the solution is approximately written as pi = 2
−i for i < n with pn = 2
1−n.
Note that the latter one actually performs better than presented in Ref. [4], since
we have taken all the possibilities into consideration. In any case, these become
smaller than the outcome from our NE solution.
As Eq. (3) indicates, the number of terms to consider increases exponentially as
n grows, making the exact enumeration of probabilities intractable. Although our
current computational resources allow us to arrive only up to n = 12, our procedure
provides a systematic way to take all the combinatorial cases into account for any n,
in principle. We believe that the behaviors shown in Fig. 2 give a clue to anticipate
~pNE in the limit of large n. Specifically, we sketch a way to perform this task: The
NE solution is obtained when ci = cj for all i and j. This means that we can
set ci to a certain constant c0 for i = 1, . . . , n. The point is that ci has only one
more variable, pi, than ci−1, so that we can attack each variable pi one by one.
For example, Eq. (4) with c1 = c0 gives p1(c0) = 1 − c1/(n−1)0 . Substituting this
value into Eq. (5) and with c2 = c0 gives a value for p2(c0), and so on. If the
correct NE-value is chosen so that c0 = cNE then the equilibrium solution, ~pNE
is obtained. When there exist several real solutions for pi then the correct root
can be found using the restriction 0 < pi < 1 and the normalization condition∑i
j=1 pj < 1. The procedure for a three-players (n = 3) game, where we have
c0 = cNE = 28− 16
√
3 ≈ 0.287 (Fig. 2b), goes as follows:
c1 = c0 = (1− p1)2 ⇒ p1 ≈ 0.4643.
c2 = c0 = (1− p2)2 − 2p1(1− p1 − p2)
⇒ [inserting p1]⇒ p2 ≈ 0.2684.
c3 = c0 = (1− p3)2 − 2p1(1− p1 − p3)− 2p2(1− p2 − p3) + 2p1p2
⇒ [inserting p1 and p2]⇒ p3 ≈ 0.2673± 0.0246i.
The fact that the last solution is complex indicates that the value of c0 is not
exactly correct. Adding more digits decreases the imaginary part while the real
part moves closer to the correct solution (e.g., c0 = 0.287187 gives p3 = 0.267949−
5.04978×10−4i). Since there is no general formula for roots of polynomials of degree
larger than four, it seems that this procedure should be carried out numerically.
Figure 3 shows the behavior of ci for i = 1 to 4 and n = 9. The solution of pi is
obtained in each step by finding the crossing point ci = c0 (where pi−1 has been
inserted into ci).
To sum up, the benefit of this procedure is that if we know the correct NE-
value, c0 = cNE, then we can calculate the probabilities one by one up to any i
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Fig 3. The expressions ci as functions of pi for n = 9 players. A Nash equilibrium solution is
obtained when ci = cNE for all i ≤ n. p1 is found by the condition c1 = cNE. Inserting this
value into c2 allows for a determination of p2 as the crossing point between c2 and cNE, and so
on. Or the value of cNE can be obtained in this way by finding c0 which fulfills the normalization
condition
∑
n
i=1
pi = 1. The two dotted horizontal lines represent the interval within which cNE
must lie if we use the expressions up to c4 instead of cn.
we want or are capable of doing within our computational resources, for any n. In
many situations it might, for example, be enough to know the solution up to certain
i above which pi’s are negligible. The method of solving for all i simultaneously
instead results in an all-or-nothing situation. Of course, the down side is that we
need to know cNE in advance. However, recalling that cNE = WNE ≡W (~pNE; ~pNE),
we see the limiting behavior limn→∞ ncNE = limn→∞ nWNE in Fig. 2(b). Putting
such a c0 = cNE into this procedure may thus yield ~pNE for large n. The solution
obtained in this way up to i = 4 for n = 9 and c0 = 0.0985 ≈ cNE (see Fig. 3) is
~p = (0.2515, 0.2349, 0.2087, 0.1643, ...). This can be compared to the result obtained
from solving for all i simultaneously, which is ~p = (0.2515, 0.2348, 0.2086, 0.1641, ...).
This method could also be used to find the actual NE solution, without knowing
cNE, by iterating the procedure until a self-consistent solution is found for all i.
If this is again beyond our computational power, one could at least determine an
interval in which c0 = cNE lies. Let’s say that we use expressions for ci up to
i = j. If c0 is too small then the normalization gets violated by
∑j
i=1 pi > 1. If
c0 is too large then the crossing points result in probabilities that are too small to
add up to one in total, as long as pi is a monotonically decreasing function of i.
Thus, the largest possible sum of all n probabilities is obtained if pi is uniform for
i ≥ j, so the sum ∑ji=1 pi + (n− j)pj must be larger or equal to one. The interval
obtained for n = 9 and j = 4 is marked by the two horizontal, dotted lines in Fig.
3 (c0,min = 0.078 and c0,max = 0.146). This interval becomes narrower as higher
values of i are addressed. Note that when c0 is changed all the curves ci for i > 1
also change since we get new pj ’s with j < i to be inserted into ci.
3. Discussion
We have shown a way of taking all the combinatorial possibilities into account for
the LUPI (lowest unique positive integer) game and proposed a procedure to find a
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Nash equilibrium for a general number of players, n. It turns out, however, that the
number of terms to consider grows exponentially in n, and that the computational
capability of our personal computer can only solve the problem up to n = 12
players. To deal with this problem we also suggest an alternative way of solving for
the equilibrium strategy for each value of i at a time, by inserting an estimate of
the average expected payoff of each player. This procedure allows the problem to
be solved sequentially instead of solving the whole problem simultaneously.
We also have found that a uniform solution distributes nearly optimal outcomes
equally among all the players. However, this would be driven to a suboptimal
equilibrium solution, so we may regard this n-person game as an example of a
social dilemma to manifest a conflict between group and individual interests.
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